








The Biotechnology Sector: “Bounds” to Market Structure 













Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics Association 








Copyright 2008 by Ian Sheldon.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim copies of this document 
for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such 
copies.
                                                 
* This project is supported by the National Research Initiative of the Cooperative State Research, Education and 
Extension Service, USDA, Grant # GRT00009506.  All correspondence should be addressed to:  Ian Sheldon, 
Department of Agricultural, Environmental and Development Economics, The Ohio State University, 2120 Fyffe 
Road, Columbus, Ohio-43210.  Voice-mail: 614-292-2194, e-mail: sheldon.1@osu.edu 
  
 










This  paper  examines  whether  it  makes  sense  to  consider  Sutton’s  “bounds”  approach  as  a 
candidate theory for explaining the recent evolution of market structure in the biotechnology 
sector, and to speculate whether market structure will change if the industry begins to introduce 
second-generation GM products that are of more direct benefit to consumers.  A key result is that 
the market structure is bounded in the presence of endogenous sunk costs, implying care should 
be taken when inferring any correlation between R&D expenditure and seller concentration in 
the biotechnology sector.   
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1.  Introduction 
Since  the  introduction  of  genetically  modified  (GM)  crops  in  the  mid-1990s,  considerable 
concern has been expressed about GM food by a wide number of groups, including farmers, 
consumer groups, retailers and governments (Sheldon, 2002).  While much of the discussion has 
focused  on  food  safety  and  environmental  issues  relating  to  GM  foods,  some  of  the  public 
opposition to agricultural biotechnology has been based on the concern that a few large firms 
will  exercise  control  over  the  global  food  supply  (Harhoff,  Régibeau  and  Rockett,  2001).  
Related to this is the concern that firms in the biotechnology sector will not develop products that 
are beneficial to society, rather there will be systematic biases in the types of GM crops that 
private firms will select for development.  These concerns about the industry revolve around two 
well-known arguments from the industrial organization literature:  first, what determines market 
structure; and second, to what extent is there a causal link between market structure and the 
extent and nature of innovation? 
In the case of agricultural biotechnology, there is evidence for extensive consolidation in the 
sector both in terms of both patent and firm ownership (Harhoff et al., 2001; Graff, Rausser and 
Small, 2003; Pray, Oehmke, and Naseem, 2005; King and Schimmelpfennig, 2005; Brennan, 
Pray,  Naseem  and  Oehmke,  2005;  Marco  and  Rausser,  2008).    For  example,  King  and 
Schimmelpfennig (2005) report that since 1998, just six firms, Dow, Dupont, Monsanto from the 
US, and BASF, Bayer, and Syngenta from Europe, have accounted for over 80 percent of GM 
crop trials for release in the US.  By 2002, the same six firms also accounted for over 40 percent 
of private-sector agricultural biotechnology patents issued in the US.  Much of this concentration 
of biotechnology patent ownership has been due to extensive merger and acquisition activity in 
the sector.  Pray et al. (2005) report a flurry of mergers and acquisitions between 1994 and 2000  
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in the five major GM crops in the US, corn, cotton, potatoes, soybeans and tomatoes, with a peak 
of 22 mergers in 2000.  This process of consolidation appears also to have had a significant 
impact on the concentration of patent ownership in both the US and European Union, where the 
six-firm concentration ratio for patents rose from 36 to 50 percent, and from 32 to 53 percent, 
respectively (Harhoff et al., 2001).  The levels of observed market concentration are even higher 
when the focus shifts to products approved for inclusion in food, the top three firms, Monsanto, 
AgroEvo, and Novartis, accounting for 66 percent of approvals by the end of the 1990s (Harhoff 
et al., 2001).   
Such concentration ratios are well over the levels that typically trigger concern by the anti-
trust authorities about the impact of mergers and acquisitions on market structure.  In addition, 
some analysts have also begun to ask whether such an increase in seller concentration has a 
negative  or  positive  impact  on  the  degree  of  innovation  in  agricultural  biotechnology.    For 
example, Brennan et al. (2005) argue that the leading biotechnology firms have the ability to 
decrease  total  industry  investment  in  research  and  development  (R&D)  because  of  the 
concentration of patent ownership.  They also argue though that it is ambiguous whether the 
same firms have an incentive to reduce their innovatory efforts.  Counter to this, the intensity of 
R&D expenditures in the biotechnology sector is clearly very high.  Over the period 1996-2000, 
the ratio of R&D expenditures to product sales for US biotechnology companies averaged 71.4 
percent, far exceeding the levels in industries such as drugs and medicines, where the ratio of 
R&D expenditures to sales was 10.5 percent over the same period (Lavoie, 2004).   
While  it  is  clear  that  the  structure  of  the  biotechnology  sector  has  changed  in  the  past 
decade, and that there may be some connection between market structure and innovation, the key 
jumping-off point of this paper is that the modern industrial organization no longer subscribes to  
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the  view  of  early  researchers  such  as  Bain  (1956)  that  market  structure  is  determined 
exogenously by factors such as economies of scale and other barriers to entry, which in turn has 
a direct impact on the rate of innovation (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982).  Instead the direction of 
causation debate that once raged over whether industries with high concentration generate more 
R&D activity or that industries in which firms conduct a good deal of R&D tend to become more 
concentrated, has been replaced with the widespread acceptance of the argument that in fact 
concentration  and  R&D  intensity  are  both  endogenous  variables  simultaneously  determined 
within an equilibrium system (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Sutton, 1998).  This is supported by 
the fact that there is no empirical consensus in the literature as to the form of the relationship, if 
any, between R&D intensity and concentration (Cohen and Levin, 1989). 
Therefore, the overarching question addressed in this paper is what might be the process that 
jointly determines market structure and innovative activity in the biotechnology sector, and how 
might it be affected by increasing integration of world markets?  A recent paper by Roe and 
Sheldon (2007), which draws on the earlier work of Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983), shows that 
market structure and efforts to improve product quality are jointly determined in a model where 
the fixed costs of R&D rise sharply with effort and where the distribution of income across the 
population of consumers takes a particular form.  However, in some respects the model is very 
narrow in that it is quite sensitive to the fact that firms are assumed to play a Bertrand-Nash 
game in prices, and that in equilibrium, changes in the size of the market have no impact on 
market structure but simply result in higher quality products in equilibrium.  Such a result seems 
at odds with the possibility that as markets grow due to greater international integration, they will 
in fact become more fragmented in terms of firm concentration.  Consequently, in this paper we 
explore the relevance of the more general “bounds” approach to market structure laid out by  
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Sutton (1991, 1998), and summarized in his recent chapter in the third volume of the Handbook 
of  Industrial  Organization  (Armstrong  and  Porter,  2007).    This  approach  ties  down  the 
circumstances under which markets become more fragmented as they become larger, and the 
conditions under which such convergence breaks down in the presence of endogenous sunk costs 
of innovation. 
In this context, the specific objective of this paper is to examine whether it makes sense to 
consider Sutton’s “bounds” approach as a candidate theory for explaining the recent evolution of 
market  structure  in  the  biotechnology  sector,  and  to  speculate  whether  market  structure  will 
change if the industry begins to introduce second-generation GM products that are of more direct 
benefit to consumers.  The remainder of the paper breaks down as follows:  in section 2, a brief 
rationale is given for why analyzing market structure in the biotechnology sector matters, while 
in  section  3,  the  core  ideas  in  Sutton’s  “bounds”  approach  are  outlined  along  with  brief 
discussion about how relevant the model might be for understanding structural change in the 
biotechnology sector.  Finally in section 4, the paper is summarized along with some concluding 
remarks.   
 
2.  Rationale for Analyzing Market Structure in Biotechnology 
The very recent evolution of the biotechnology industry and the rapid adoption of GM crops 
have  provoked  intense  public  debate  about  the  future  direction  of  the  industry.    This  paper 
focuses on one key aspect of this debate:  the nature of market structure in the agricultural 
biotechnology sector and its interaction with innovation, as well as the impact of the GM food 
regulatory system on market structure.  Understanding how market structure is evolving in the  
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biotechnology  sector,  therefore,  has  important  implications  for  the  sector  itself  as  well  as 
farmers, consumers and regulators. 
Importantly,  this  paper  is  the  first  to  suggest  applying  Sutton’s  “bounds”  approach  to 
analyzing market structure in the biotechnology sector, focusing on the extent to which seller 
concentration is a function of endogenous sunk costs such as R&D outlays on new products, as 
opposed  to  the  more  traditional  argument  based  on  exogenous  sunk  costs.    The  beauty  of 
applying  this  model,  as  witnessed  by  Sutton’s  (1991,  1998)  own  research,  is  not  only  its 
theoretical  rigor,  but  also  that  it  can  be  implemented  empirically  in  a  fairly  straightforward 
manner through collection of some key parameters, as well as through the use of more traditional 
case-study analysis.  In addition, the model can be used to assess how market structure of the 
biotechnology  industry  might  change  as  firms  develop  second-generation  GM  crops  in  an 
environment of increased regulatory vigilance. 
The rationale for a comprehensive understanding of market structure in the development and 
marketing of GM products is the oft-expressed concern by both farmers and food consumers in 
the US and Europe that increasing seller concentration in this industry will result in too much 
control over the food system being vested in the hands of a few multinational firms who may not 
invest in developing new products with the greatest social benefit, both in terms of increased 
production in agriculture, as well as the supply of traits beneficial to consumers. 
The concerns of farmers and consumers might be dismissed on the grounds that they simply 
represent the typical fears of the former about other actors in the food marketing chain, and that 
consumer concerns are those of a small minority with a strong anti-corporate bias.  However, the 
increase  in  seller  concentration  in  the  biotechnology  sector  has  already  resulted  in  serious 
analysis by some observers of the industry.  While there may be perfectly legitimate reasons for  
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an industry becoming concentrated, there is a concern that there will not only be a static welfare 
loss associated with this rise in seller concentration, but that firms will also abuse their market 
dominance by engaging in anti-competitive practices.  For example, Harhoff et al. (2001) argue 
that the integration of seed and agricultural chemical firms may have biased the types of GM 
crops introduced by the sector.  In addition, business contracts such as tie-in contracts between 
GM seeds and complementary products such as herbicides may be exclusionary in nature and 
therefore grounds for anti-trust scrutiny.  
The breadth of the debate about biotechnology and GM food also creates a dilemma for the 
regulator (Harhoff et al., 2001).  On the one hand, increased rigor of the regulatory approval 
process, notably in the European Union, has partly been a response to the concerns of consumers 
and NGOs about the safety and environmental impact of GM crops.  On the other hand, tougher 
regulation of GM crop approval may create a barrier to entry, affecting seller concentration in 
two  ways:    first,  large  firms  with  extensive  experience  of  similar  regulatory  processes  will 
initially own a larger share of approved products, although this “expertise effect” will eventually 
be dissipated over time; second, costly approval procedures increase sunk costs, and therefore 
reduce the number of firms actively developing GM products for regulatory approval, an effect 
that will persist over time. 
 
3.  The “Bounds” Approach to Market Structure 
Market Structure and Innovation  
Early analysis of innovation in industrial organization drew on Bain’s (1951) structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) paradigm which argued that levels of concentration in an industry (structure), 
determine pricing behavior of firms in that industry (conduct), which in turn affects dimensions  
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of market performance such as price-cost margins and R&D outlays relative to sales.  A key 
assumption of this model is that market structure is determined exogenously by given barriers to 
entry such as economies of scale.  This model was widely applied in the industrial organization 
literature (Schmalensee, 1989), as well as in the agricultural economics literature, notably in the 
work of the NC 117 Regional Research Committee (see Marion, 1985; and Connor, Rogers, 
Marion  and  Mueller,  1985).    By  the  mid-1970s,  however,  the  SCP  paradigm  began  to  be 
questioned  generally  in  the  industrial  organization  literature  (Cowling  and  Waterson,  1974; 
Jacquemin, 1987), and specifically in the empirical literature on market structure and innovation 
(Cohen and Levin, 1989). 
At  this  point,  the  so-called  New  Empirical  Industrial  Organization  (NEIO)  literature 
evolved, focusing on the econometric estimation of market conduct, with multiple studies in the 
industrial  organization  literature  (Bresnahan,  1989;  Perloff,  Karp  and  Golan,  2007)  and  the 
agricultural economics literature (Sexton and Lavoie, 2001; Sheldon and Sperling, 2003).   At 
the  same  time,  several  researchers  returned  to  the  old  question  of  what  actually  determines 
market  structure  (Baumol,  Panzar  and  Willig,  1982;  Baumol,  1982;  Panzar,  1989).    A  key 
contribution  of  this  literature  was  the  focus  on  what  determines  the  optimal  structure  of  an 
industry, both in the single and multiple-product cases.
1 
For example, in the single-product case, given minimum efficient scale of a plant is 10,000 
units, and the industry output vector is 30,000 units, then the equilibrium market structure is one 
of three firms producing at minimum average cost.  There was nothing particularly radical about 
this result, but Baumol and his collaborators drew fire because of their argument that as long as a 
market is perfectly contestable, firms in that market will produce at minimum efficient scale and 
                                                 
1 The literature introduced the important concept of sub-additive cost functions to the analysis of both economies of 
scale and economies of scope.   
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price at marginal cost, unless they are a natural monopoly, in which case they will adopt second-
best  Ramsey  pricing.
2    Perfect  contestability  occurs  where  entry  and  exit  into  a  market  is 
absolutely costless, such markets being vulnerable to hit-and-run-entry.  Much of the criticism of 
the contestable markets literature focused on the assumption of costless entry, and the pricing 
reaction of incumbent firms.  For example, Schwartz (1986) argues that even with ease of entry 
and exit, the ability of incumbent firms to change prices rapidly in response to entry could still 
result in markets being non-contestable. Notwithstanding the criticism, a key contribution of the 
contestable markets literature was to focus on the endogenous determination of market structure, 
simultaneously with the pricing, output and other decisions of firms. 
The latter insight also carried over into the literature on innovation and market structure.  
Prior to the late-1970s, the literature in this area was dominated by two key hypotheses, typically 
associated with Schumpeter (1947):  first, there is a positive relationship between innovation and 
monopoly power; and, second, large firms are more than proportionately innovative than small 
firms.
3 Counter to this, Arrow (1962) concluded that the incentive to innovate is less under 
monopoly than competition.  Much of the early empirical work focused on seeking a correlation 
between the intensity of R&D, measured by the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales and some 
measure of seller concentration, and there was also considerable debate about the direction of 
causation, i.e., concentration to R&D intensity or vice versa (Sutton, 1996).  This dispute was 
resolved theoretically by  Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), who showed, that except in the very 
short-run,  both  market  structure  and  innovative  activity  are  endogenous.    Consequently,  the 
degree of seller concentration could not be taken as given, and is instead dependent on other 
conditions such as demand, the technology of research and so on.  This has been followed up on 
                                                 
2 See Sharkey (1982). 
3 As noted in Kamien and Schwartz (1982), while the first of these hypotheses is correctly attributed to Schumpeter, 
the second was probably due more to Galbraith (1952).   
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extensively in the work of Sutton (1991; 1997; 1998; 2007) has focused on the extent to which 
firm activities, such as product differentiation and R&D intensity are determined endogenously 
along with market structure. 
Despite  the  theoretical  arguments  throwing  doubt  on  the SCP  approach,  empirical  work 
continued  on  what  Sutton  (1996)  characterizes  as  the  ‘reduced-form’  relationship  between 
innovation and seller concentration.  This empirical literature has been extensively reviewed by 
Cohen and Levin (1989), who note that while most studies have found a positive correlation 
between  some  measure  of  R&D  intensity  and  seller  concentration,  the  relationship  is 
considerably weaker when industry-specific effects are controlled for.  In addition, other studies 
find either a negative or a non-monotonic relationship. 
In  Sutton’s  (1996)  view,  the  mixed  empirical  results  on  the  correlation  between  R&D 
intensity and seller concentration are not that surprising.  Specifically he suggests two reasons 
for this, which will be explored in the remainder of this paper in the context of the biotechnology 
sector:  first, R&D intensity, as measured by R&D expenditures to sales ratios, is not a very good 
way of describing the technological characteristics of an industry; and second, any link between 
R&D  intensity  and  seller  concentration  involves  a  “bounds”  constraint,  which  will  not  be 
captured in a reduced-form regression specification across a sample of industries. 
The Basic “Bounds” Approach 
To fix the basic idea of Sutton’s “bounds” approach, assume initially that firms in an industry 
sell a homogeneous product, and to do this they have to incur an exogenous sunk cost of ￿, which 
might be thought of as the cost of acquiring a plant of minimum efficient scale, or the necessary 
technology to undertake production, after which they compete in price.  It turns out that the 
equilibrium market structure C is a function of the size of the market S relative to sunk costs ￿,  
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and the intensity of price competition.  In the case of Bertrand-Nash competition, the market can 
only sustain one firm in equilibrium, as multiple entry drives price down to marginal cost, firms 
making a net loss of ￿ in equilibrium. Nested in this case is the perfectly contestable outcome 
referred to earlier, where sunk costs ￿ = 0, and a continuum of equilibria exist, i.e., two or more 
firms enter, price equaling marginal cost.  As Sutton (1991) suggests, this is a “knife-edge” result 
where sunk costs have to be exactly zero. 
In the case of Cournot-Nash competition, market structure becomes more fragmented as 
market  size  increases  relative  to  sunk  costs.    More  precisely,  assume  an  iso-elastic  demand 
schedule, X = S/p, where p is market price, X is quantity sold, and S is the size of the market, i.e., 
total expenditure.  If N firms have entered the market, firm i’s profit is = ( ) - p ￿ i i j i i p x x cx , 
where c are its constant marginal costs.  When maximized with respect to xi, given the rival 
firms’  output  choice,  this  yields  the  symmetric  equilibrium  price  and  output  per 
firm, = {1+1/( -1)} p c N and
2 ={ / ( -1/ ) x S c N N ,  and  the  equilibrium  profit  of  each  firm, 
2 = ( - ) = / ￿ p c x S N .    Given the entry decisions of its k rivals, a firm i will incur a sunk cost ￿ 
on entering the market, such that it will earn net profits of,
2 ( +1) - S k ￿ .  If this is positive, the 
number  of  firms  entering  in  equilibrium  will  be  equivalent  to = N* S ￿ .      This  result  is 
illustrated in panel (a) of figure 1, where market concentration C falls with the size of the market, 
given  a  specific  level  of  sunk  costs  ￿.    Importantly,  due  to  the  fact  that  firms  will  not  be 
recovering their sunk costs, a point such as X cannot be an equilibrium outcome.  As a result, 
there will either have to be consolidation by acquisition or merger, or there will be exit of firms 
as  they  are  unwilling  to  incur  additional  fixed  costs  of  replacing  their  plant  as  it  becomes 
obsolete.  
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Alternatively, if we assume that firms are able to horizontally differentiate their products 
exogenous  sunk  costs  now  relate  to  producing  a  specific  variety  and  price  competition  is 
mitigated  in  equilibrium.    This  results  in  the  relationship  between  market  structure  and  size 
shifting down to the left in panel (b) of figure 1.  In addition, this function is a lower bound to 
equilibrium seller concentration, as there is a possibility of multiple equilibria, due to the fact 
that, either different firms will enter each sub-market, the same firms may enter all sub-markets, 
or firms occupy several niche markets. 









Lower bound to C
 
Now suppose that firms can vertically differentiate their products in the sense that each 
product  has  a  single  quality  attribute  u  which  can  be  enhanced  through  R&D  outlays.
4  All 
consumers  have  the  same  tastes  for  higher  quality,  their  utility  function  being  of  the 
form,
d d - =
1 ) ( z ux U , where x is the product of interest, z is a Hicksian composite product, and 
                                                 
4 Sutton (1991) presented his analysis in terms of advertising, but also notes in his introduction, that it could equally 
well apply to R&D.  Interestingly, the case-studies presented in Sutton’s book all relate to the food manufacturing 
sector.  
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consumers’ marginal utility is increasing in u.  Firms still incur initial sunk costs of ￿, but they 
now choose a level of u at an additional sunk cost R(u) before competing in price.  This setting 
allows for the possibility that the link between increased market size S and structure C is broken.  
Specifically, competitive escalation of R(u) raises the equilibrium level of sunk costs {￿ + R(u)} 
as S increases, offsetting any tendency toward market fragmentation, i.e., R&D is an endogenous 
barrier to entry.  If, however there are very rapidly diminishing returns to R&D in terms of 
consumer response to higher quality, i.e., R(u)￿, then market fragmentation may still occur as S 
increases, and R&D is an exogenous barrier to entry. 
Sutton (1991) models the additional sunk costs R(u) in terms of perceived quality, via the 
following function,  ) 1 ( / ) ( - =
g g u a u R , where a is the cost per unit of R&D activity, and 1 > g , 
where higher values ofg  reflect more rapidly diminishing returns to increases in R&D outlays.  
Combining this with the initial sunk costs, a firm’s total sunk costs are ) 1 ( / ) ( - + =
g g e u a u F .  
The  elasticity  of  F(u)  with  respect  to  increases  in  quality  is  given  as 
} / ) / ( 1 { / / F a du dF F u g e g J - - = = ,  about  which  the  following  can  be  stated:  (i) 
as ¥ ® ¥ ® ) ( , u F u , so J tends tog  independent of the initial sunk coste  and the unit cost of 
R&D a;  (ii) for finite values of u, and hence F(u), then  g J > if  g e / a < , and  g J < if  g e / a > ; 
(iii) when  g e / a = , then  J  is constant for all levels of u.  It turns out that the relationship 
between the size of the market S and seller concentration C depends on the ratio of e to g / a . 
At the entry stage, each firm sets the same level of quality u, all firms incurring the same 
level of sunk costs, so that  ) ; ( * /
2 S N F N S = = p , where F*(.) is an implicit value for the level 
of fixed R&D outlays incurred by firms at equilibrium, given the number of firms entering.  The 
equilibrium values of N and F*(.) can be solved as functions of  g e , ,S and a.  Without deriving it  
  13 
explicitly,  solution  of  the  model  generates  an  expression  in  (N,F)  space, 
] / ) / ( 1 [ 2 / 2 ) / 1 ( F a N N g e g - - = - + , which is upward sloping, vertical, or downward sloping 
depending  on  whether g e / a > , g e / a = or g e / a < ,  r.    Equilibrium  R&D  is  given  by  the 
intersection  of  this  locus  with  the  zero  profit  relation,  F=S/N
2,  which  describes  a  set  of 
downward-sloping curves in (N, F) space, parameterized by S.  This in turn impacts the market 
size-seller concentration relationship.  For example, if  g e / a = , and for a sufficiently small 
value of S, the equilibrium involves zero R&D outlays, and the earlier Cournot model applies, 
with  e p = = = F F S
2 / , corresponding to the values S1 and N1 in panel (a) of figure.  As S 
increases, a value of N is eventually reached where R&D begins, and after that point, further 
increases  in  S  involve  only  increasing  levels  of  R&D,  with  no  additional  changes  in  seller 
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In figure 3, the market size-seller concentration relationship is plotted for different values of 
initial sunk costs,e relative to g / a , where  e e e e g e e e ˆ / 5 4 3 2 1 = > > > = > = a .  The locus SS  
traces out the points at which there is a switch from the no-R&D to an R&D regime, defined by 
where if N firms have no R&D, it is just profitable for one firm to deviate.  This locus will also 
shift with increases in the unit cost of R&D, resulting in lower seller concentration for some 
intermediate market sizes. 
S
C=1/N





= ￿ ￿ 1
ˆ ￿ ￿ 5 =
￿ a ￿ 2 = /
X
￿
   
Two comments can be made about this figure:  first, increases in market size do not lead to 
indefinite  decreases  in  seller  concentration;  second,  the  market  size-seller  concentration 
relationship is not necessarily monotonic.  In other words, R&D is not an exogenous barrier to 
entry  as  in  the  traditional  literature,  whereby  the  cost  of  R&D  merely  shifts  the  negative 
relationship between seller concentration and market size.  Instead, low sunk costs e are initially 
associated with falling seller concentration as the size of the market increases, and then seller  
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concentration increases.  This follows from the fact that R&D only becomes profitable when the 
market reaches a certain size, which itself varies with the level of seller concentration along ￿￿, 
i.e., a lower value of e implies that the switch-point will be at  lower level of seller concentration.  
In addition, once in the R&D regime, increases in the market size result in increases in R&D 
expenditure, i.e., market structure becomes independent of the initial sunk costs, and low sunk 
cost only permits a low degree of seller concentration over a specific range.  Finally, if the 
market is at point X, it will require a discrete increase in R&D expenditures to get up to the 
equilibrium schedule. 
The Basic “Bounds” Approach and the Biotechnology Sector 
Casual empiricism suggests that evolution of market structure in the biotechnology sector may fit 
this type of “bounds” model, as illustrated in figure 4.   
S
C
Figure 4: Market Structure, Sunk Costs and R&D in Biotechnology Industry
￿1
F1(u)
X Initial market structure
X to Y mergers/acquisitions










F1 (u)= sunk costs in 1980s
F2 (u) = sunk costs in 1990s
￿￿ = separation no-R&D/additional R&D – function of unit cost of R&D 
S
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Initially, in the 1980s, the sector was populated by a large set of small dedicated start-up 
firms incurring the sunk costs of doing basic research, F1(u) (Lavoie and Sheldon, 2000).  Then 
in the 1990s, the opportunity arose to tailor the genetic structure of crops, which required firms 
in the industry to take advantage of complementarities between three types of intellectual assets, 
relating to plant genetic transformation, genes, and elite germ plasm, driving up industry sunk 
costs to F2 (u).  As a result, there was rapid consolidation via acquisition of start-up firms as the 
major life science firms attempted to avoid the additional transactions costs of acquiring these 
assets via arms’ length licensing arrangements (Graff, Rausser and Small, 2003), i.e., equilibrium 
C changes from X to Y.  Finally, we can speculate that this also coincided with growth in the size 
of the market for GM crops as farmers in both North and South America rapidly adopted several 
key GM crops, causing biotechnology firms to incur additional sunk costs of R&D, equilibrium 
market structure moving from Y to Y' . 
A More General “Bounds” Approach 
While the above story seems plausible, it is important to understand that the model makes a key 
simplifying assumption – a firm’s R&D spans all of the products it offers within the industry.  
Consider  instead  the  case  where  firms  engage  in  R&D  with  the  objective  of  improving  the 
attributes of the various products they offer.  We can imagine an initial equilibrium characterized 
by  a  fragmented  industry  where  all  firms  have  small  market  share  with  low  R&D  outlays.  
However, there may be a situation where a firm(s) finds it profitable to outspend other firms and 
capture a larger market share.   Sutton (1997; 1998) argues that whether a firm(s) can outspend 
their  rivals  and  still  make  sufficient  profits  to  cover  their  R&D  outlays  will  depend  on  an 
escalation parameter ￿, the value of which will depend on the pattern of technology and tastes, 
and the nature of price competition in the industry.  
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More specifically, the effectiveness of an escalation strategy depends on the success of R&D 
outlays in raising consumers’ willingness to pay for the firm’s products within a sub-market.  It 
also depends on supply and demand linkages between different R&D trajectories and different 
sub-markets.  Where these linkages are strong due to economies of scope in R&D and/or a high 
degree of substitution in demand, ￿ will be high, while it is low with no economies of scope in 
R&D and a low degree of substitution across sub-markets. 
Following Sutton (1997; 1998), the escalation mechanism can be illustrated with use of a 
linear-demand example and Cournot-Nash behavior by firms.  There are n varieties of some 
product all consumers having the same utility function over these products, with S consumers in 
the  market,  so  that  output  of  a  given  good  k  is  Sxk.    The  utility  function  is  given 
by,
2
2 = - -2 . +
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
k k l
k
k k l<k k k l
x x x
U x ￿ M
u u u
, for  > 0, > 0 k l u u , where M denotes consumption of 












Each  firm  operates  along  a  single  technological  trajectory,  where  ￿  measures  the  degree  of 
substitution between products associated with different trajectories.  Marginal costs are assumed 
zero, and there are sunk costs, F(u), of producing quality u, where  2 , 1 , ) ( > ³ = b e
b u u u F .  If 
all qualities are unity, sunk costs aree .  Following Sutton (1997), the equilibrium configurations 
are shown in figure 5 in (n, C1) space, bounded by functions (i) and (ii) – the shaded area.  The 
former is a viability function, ensuring each firm’s product covers its fixed costs; the latter is a 
stability function, such that there is no profitable gap in the configuration of products.
5  Note that 
the stability function starts from a point where a the seller concentration ratio is 1, i.e., as long as 
                                                 
5 The viability function can be seen in terms of the “survivor” principle as discussed by Alchian (1950), and Stigler 
(1968), inter alia.  The stability function is based on the principle that if there is a gap in the market, there will be 
one “smart” agent that fills it.  See Sutton (1997; 1998) for further discussion of these functions, as well as a formal 
proof of the results.   
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￿ is strictly positive, a monopolist can deter entry by setting u sufficiently high. The stability 
function  (ii)  also  cuts  the  viability  function  (i)  above 1 C ,  the  minimum  level  of  seller 
concentration  X  being  bounded  away  from  zero  as ¥ ® S   .    For  any 2 > b ,  the  seller 
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The key parameters in the equilibrium areb and ￿, generating the two core ideas in Sutton’s 
(1998) more general “bounds model: (i) whereb  is low, i.e. R&D is effective, and ￿ is high, i.e., 
progress  on  one  research  trajectory  results  in  one  firm  gaining  customers  from  other  firms’ 
trajectories,  then  the  escalation  parameter  ￿  is  high,  and  there  will  be  high  levels  of  R&D 
expenditures as well as a high level of seller concentration; (ii) whereb  is low, but there are  
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many technically independent research trajectories generating products that are poor substitutes, 
i.e., ￿ is low, there can be a high level of R&D expenditures consistent with a low degree of 
seller concentration.  So where ￿ is high, high R&D on one research trajectory can eliminate low 
spenders on other trajectories, and over time new trajectories eliminate older trajectories. 
From Theory to Empirics 
While  ￿  cannot  be  measured  directly,  the  theory  basic  places  constraints  on  two  observable 
variables whose joint interaction implies a value for ￿, thereby placing a lower bound on market 
structure  C.    One  of  these  variables  is  the  R&D  to  sales  ratio,  the  second  is  the  degree  of 
proliferation of distinct R&D trajectories in the industry which can be measured by what Sutton 
(1998)  terms  the  h  index  which  can  be  proxied  by  the  fraction  of  industry  sales  revenue 
accounted for by the largest product class.  Consequently, Sutton’s (1991) earlier model is nested 
in this more general model as the special case of h = 1. 
From this more general theory, predictions about R&D intensity and market structure can be 
derived.  If R&D outlays are ineffective in raising consumers’ willingness to pay for a firm’s 
products, R&D intensity will necessarily be low.  Consequently if we observe a high R&D to 
sales  ratio,  it  implies  that  R&D  outlays  are  effective.    Seller  concentration  will  then  be 
determined by the strength of the linkages between sub-markets, i.e., it will tend to be high 
where the linkages are strong, making an escalation strategy profitable, and the h index will tend 
to  be  high.    With  weak  linkages  on  the  demand  and  supply  side,  even  if  R&D  outlays  are 
effective, seller concentration will be low, as will the h index.  As a result, a joint restriction can 
be placed on the observable parameters:  in an industry with a high R&D to sales ratio, seller 
concentration C should increase with h.  Alternatively, an industry with a low R&D to sales ratio 
will converge to a fragmented market structure independent of h.  In addition, if sunk costs ￿  
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increase, seller concentration will increase irrespective of R&D intensity, but with low R&D 
intensity, this increase in concentration will be eroded over time as the market grows. 
In  the  case  of  high  R&D  intensity,  the  impact  of  an  increase  in  sunk  costs  on  seller 
concentration has to be separated out from the effects of escalation in R&D outlays.  Returning 
to the stylized facts of the biotechnology industry described in figure 4, the increase in sunk costs 
was  the  initial mechanism  for  the  biotechnology  sector  to  become  more  concentrated  in  the 
1990s  as  start-up  firms  were  acquired  by  larger  life-science  companies,  but  the 
complementarities between the different intellectual property rights they acquired, along with the 
willingness  of  a  growing  number  of  farmers  to  purchase  GM  crops,  resulted  in  an  R&D 
escalation strategy that has led to further increases in seller concentration. 
 
4.  Summary and Conclusions 
In  this  paper,  the  potential  relationship  between  R&D  and  seller  concentration  in  the 
biotechnology sector has been addressed through consideration of a “bounds” approach due to 
Sutton (1991; 1998).  In particular, it has been shown that the evolution of a concentrated market 
structure is entirely consistent with an endogenous sunk cost story.  Specifically, if firms are able 
to adopt an R&D escalation strategy either when market size increases or when they are able to 
outspend other firms on different research trajectories, there is a key non-convergence result, i.e., 
seller concentration declines initially over some range, as in the presence of exogenous sunk 
costs, and then is either bounded from zero or even increases.  Consequently, the presence of 
such a bound explains why only a weak correlation has been found between R&D intensity and 
seller concentration in cross-sectional studies.  
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In  purely  theoretical  terms,  using  Sutton’s  approach  to  analyzing  market  structure  and 
innovation  is  both  rigorous  and  logical:    it  allows  the  derivation  of  very  clear  and  testable 
hypotheses concerning the extent to which seller concentration is related to exogenous sunk costs 
and/or  endogenously  determined  along  with  R&D  activity.    However,  in  applying  Sutton’s 
model, a key issue is to establish overall whether it is a good description of what has and is 
happening in the biotechnology industry, and in particular whether the industry’s h index is equal 
to or less than one, as this impacts the complexity of both theoretical and empirical analysis.  
Importantly, a real test of the model’s validity will be whether recent introduction of GM crops 
containing  stacked  traits  will  be  accompanied  by  further  changes  in  market  structure  – 
presumably these can be regarded as products on new research trajectories compared to single-
trait  GM  crops  which  are  on  older  research  trajectories,  i.e.,  the  value  of  ￿  may  be  high. 
Likewise,  as  R&D  expenditures  are  devoted  to  GM  products  containing  traits  considered 
beneficial by consumers, it is not clear whether this will result in high seller concentration in this 
sector or product proliferation, i.e., high levels of R&D intensity may actually be accompanied 
by  modest  levels  of  seller  concentration.    What  is  clear  though  from  this  analysis  is  that 
assuming  a  direct  correlation  between  R&D  intensity  and  seller  concentration  in  the 
biotechnology industry may be misleading both in terms of understanding the evolution of the 
sector’s market structure, as well in terms of drawing normative conclusions about the impact of 
market structure on innovation in the sector.  
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